Larry Atherton
UKC Forum Member
Registered: Jun 2003
Location: Central Michigan
Posts: 6544 |
Michigan's Animal Cruelty Statute
Section 750.50b is the primary felony anti-animal cruelty provision in Michigan. This provision punishes the willful and malicious infliction of injury to animals, defined as vertebrates other than human beings, without just cause or excuse. Injuries include killing, torturing, mutilating, maiming, disfiguring, or poisoning. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.50b(1)-(2) (2001).
The offense is a felony punishable by imprisonment for no more than 4 years and/or a fine of no more than $5,000.00. §750.50b(2). The offender may be ordered to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay the costs of care, housing, and medical treatment for the animal victim, and to obtain a psychiatric or psychological evaluation and attend counseling if deemed necessary. § 750.50b(3)-(4). Further, punishment may include the temporary or permanent relinquishment of animal ownership, the violation of which subjects the offender to possible revocation of probation and the contempt powers of the court. §750.50b(5)-(6).
Although the provision purports to apply to all vertebrates other than humans, the Michigan Legislature has provided that it does not apply to certain economic or widely accepted activities. The provision does not apply to the lawful killing of livestock or customary animal husbandry of livestock, or lawful fishing, hunting, trapping, wildlife control, pest or rodent control, and animal research. § 750.50b(7)-(8). One can imagine the powerful economic interests related to this limitation. Certainly, the Legislature was hesitant to stifle important Michigan interests in hunting and agriculture.
Michigan anti-animal cruelty law also protects animals in work-related roles, such as guide dogs and police animals. The guide dog provision punishes, as a misdemeanor, conduct related to the assault, beating, harassment, injury, or impeding of the job duties of a guide or leader dog. § 750.50a(1)-(2). The section provides a rebuttable presumption of malice for conduct that continues after the impaired person accompanying the dog requests that the offender discontinue the conduct. § 750.50a(3). Further, the section defines malice as behavior ranging from the intentional harassment of the animal to knowingly engaging in conduct likely to cause injury, disturbance, or even emotional distress. § 750.50a. Punishment for the violation of this section is no more than 90 days and/or no more than $500.00. § 750.50a(2). The police animal provision prohibits conduct related to the killing of or seriously injuring a police horse or dog as felonies punishable by no more than 5 years imprisonment and/or no more than $2,500.00. §750.50c(2), (5). Prohibited conduct related to causing physical injury and harassing or interfering with a police horse or dog lawfully performing its duties are misdemeanors punishable by no more than 1 year imprisonment and/or a fine of no more than $500.00. §750.50c(3), (4), (6). This provision also punishes the misdemeanor violation during the commission of another crime as a felony punishable by no more than 2 years imprisonment and/or no more than $1,000.00. §750.50c(7). Given the increasing roles of animals in aiding disabled individuals and police officers, it is understandable why the Legislature would want to add an additional deterrent to the abuse of such animals.
A. Which animals are protected?
The current provision is explicit in its definition of those animals included under the statute, and thus courts as well as offenders are clear as to which animals are protected – all vertebrates other than humans. § 750.50b(1). The vague language of the previous provision left questions to be answered by the courts. In Iehl, the defendant was convicted under the previous provision, which punished any individual who “wilfully and maliciously kill[ed], maim[ed] or disfigure[d] any horses, cattle or any other beasts of another.” People v. Iehl, 299 N.W.2d 46, 47 (1980). The defendant argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for cruelty to animals because the dog that he killed was not considered a beast under the statute. Id. The court affirmed his conviction, finding that the Legislative intent, as determined from a similar statute enacted in the same year, was to include dogs as beasts covered by the statute. Id. Fortunately, the current statutory language dispels of the possibility of litigation related to which animals are protected under the statute by providing that all vertebrates other than humans are included.
B. Malice Requirement
The malice requirement for the intentional infliction of pain and suffering provision has been the focus of several Michigan appellate cases. Under the previous provision, the prosecution had to prove that the defendant’s conduct in injuring the animal was “willful and malicious.” Because the malice requirement for the current provision is the same, a case study with respect to the malice required under the previous provision is instructive. In Minney, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the general law of malice applied to the previous provision. People v. Minney, 119 N.W. 918, 921-22 (1908). The defendant was convicted of mutilating a horse when he cut off its tongue and raised the issue on appeal whether the lower court erred in allowing the instruction that malice towards the owner of the animal was not required. Id. at 918. The Court agreed with the lower court and seemed to hold that malice toward the owner was not necessary, using as precedent earlier cases, Petheram and Burkhardt, which held that the general law of malice provided the requisite intent to sustain a conviction. Id. at 921-22.
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Larry Atherton
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06-02-2009 05:37 PM
